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During last decades, a large body of studies has 
analyzed the effect of ownership structure or board of 
directors on firm value (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991;Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There has been a 
large body of literature that has examined both the 
empirical and theoretical effects of different 
ownership and control structures on firm value. Most 
empirical evidence in this regard has traditionally 
focused on companies with dispersed ownership 
structures, typical of the models of corporate control 
of USA and UK (Finegold et al., 2007). Throughout 
recent years, several studies have shown how 
dispersed ownership structures do not dominate as 
much as suggested by the arguments of Berle and 
Means (1932), revealing the importance of 
concentrated ownership structures in most part of the 
business world.  
The presence of shareholders holding a high 
proportion of the firm‟s capital constitutes a way to 
mitigate the effects of the separation of ownership and 
control on firm value. As Berle and Means (1932) 
asserted, the manager of a firm in which each 
shareholder holds only a small fraction of the firm‟s 
capital can engage in value reducing activities. A 
minority shareholder has weak incentives to engage in 
monitoring of managers because he or she supports all 
the costs of monitoring while getting only a small 
fraction of the benefits (the typical free rider 
problem). In contrast, a concentrated ownership 
structure in which one or more shareholders own a 
large block of equity has the potential for refuting the 
managers from engaging in moral hazard behaviour. 
A large shareholder may also be actively involved on 
the board of directors or nominate a person to 
represent him or her there, in order to ensure that 
management is acting in the interests of shareholders 
(Jensen, 1993). The relationship between directors´ 
ownership and firm value has been the focus of 
empirical research since Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
hypothesize that insider ownership
9
 is an important 
mechanism for aligning the interests of managers and 
shareholders.  
Whether directors´ ownership is beneficial or 
detrimental to firm value is an empirical question. 
Related empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive. 
On the one hand, some studies are consistent with the 
Jensen and Meckling(1976) convergence of interest 
hypothesis, which suggests that a uniformly positive 
relationship exists between insider ownership and 
                                                          
9 Insider ownership can be divided into managers’ 
ownership (managers’ shareholdings) and directors’ 
ownership (directors’ shareholdings). 




firm value. On the other hand, other studies give 
support to the Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) entrenchment hypothesis, which suggest that at 
high levels of insider ownership a negative 
relationship exists between insider ownership and 
firm value. Moreover, some authors do not find any 
significant relationship between both variables, while 
others found non-linear relationships supporting both 
the convergence of interest and entrenchment 
hypotheses.  
A key aspect of firm governance is not only the 
quantitative dimension of ownership structure, that is, 
the level of ownership concentration, but also its 
qualitative dimension, that is, the typology of the 
firm‟s shareholders (Bammens et al., 2010). The 
governance practices of family businesses (FBs) 
differ from those of non-FBs (NFBs), because not all 
large shareholders have the same incentives 
(Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006). Values and 
objectives vary across contexts and actors and this 
needs to be taken into account when designing and 
interpreting empirical studies (Huse et al., 2011). 
Thus, a contingency and contextual perspective is 
needed to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm value in order to show that in 
some contexts certain corporate designs may be 
recommended, but in other contexts other designs 
may be more important (Huse et al., 2011). 
Considering these prospective connections, our 
two main aims are to highlight the importance of 
suitably contextualising any assessment of ownership 
structure as a business governance mechanism, and to 
test whether the optimal level of directors´ 
shareholdings is different for FBs and NFBs. Thus, 
we adopt a contingency approach wherein the impact 
of directors´ shareholdings on firm vale is seen as a 
relationship that varies depending on context under 
analysis, in particular on the qualitative dimension of 
ownership structure (whether the firm is a FB). To 
that end, we address an empirical analysis for a 
sample of listed firms from Southern Europe during 
the 2001-2007 period. 
This study is expected to contribute to existing 
corporate governance literature in three main ways. 
Firstly, the Southern European business sector enables 
us to analyze the impact of directors' shareholdings on 
firm value in a context characterized by high 
ownership concentration and the presence of family 
groups in the control of a significant number of firms. 
While in the US the main issue is managers‟ 
opportunistic behavior (Type I agency problem 
owner-manager, Villalonga and Amit, 2006), in 
Southern Europe the focus is on the divergence of 
interests between large and minority shareholders 
(Type II agency problem owner-owner, Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). Unlike most existing studies, which 
have usually compared widely dispersed NFBs with 
very closely held FBs, in this study both types of 
firms, FBs and NFBs, have a concentrated ownership 
structure, that is, all firms in our sample have a large 
shareholder
10
. The monitoring role by owners and its 
effect on firm performance are not as important in US 
as in Southern European countries, where ownership 
concentration is higher, the level of investor 
protection is lower, and large blockholders have 
greater power and stronger incentives to ensure 
shareholder value maximization (Díaz and García, 
2004; Maury, 2006; Sánchez-Ballesta and García-
Meca, 2007). Given the theoretical and empirical gap 
in this knowledge, it seems important to examine 
whether within an environment of concentrated 
ownership the relationship between directors´ 
shareholdings as an insider corporate governance 
mechanism and firm value depends on the family 
nature of the large shareholder. Secondly, we control 
for nonlinearities to be consistent with both the 
convergence of interest and the entrenchment 
hypotheses. Finally, and in contrast with most prior 
studies, which have usually used cross-section 
samples and treated ownership as exogenous, we used 
a panel data design and consider the potential 
endogeneity of ownership structures (Demsetz, 1983; 
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Palia, 2001) when estimating the relationship 
between directors‟ shareholding and firm value.  
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 
reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on 
insider ownership and firm value and posits the 
hypotheses to be verified. Section 3 describes the 
sample of firms and the methodological approach 
adopted. Section 4 offers the main empirical results to 
emerge and, finally, Section 5 rounds off the paper 
with the main conclusions and implications. 
 
2. The relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value  
 
Theoretical and empirical literature considers insider 
ownership as one of the main mechanisms that affect 
firm value. Several papers examine the benefits and 
costs of insider ownership on the basis of two 
competing hypotheses. On the one hand, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) convergence of interest hypothesis 
contends that, as insider ownership in a firm 
increases, agency costs decrease because insiders 
become less inclined to divert resources away from 
value maximisation or to engage in other sub-optimal 
activities and therefore their interests and those of 
shareholders are aligned. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, several studies argue that stock ownership 
by board members gives them an incentive to ensure 
that the firm is run efficiently and to monitor 
managers carefully (e.g., Brickley et al., 1988). When 
board members have considerable holdings in a 
company‟s stock (either direct holdings of stocks or 
                                                          
10 As we further explain in the methodological section of 
this paper, the large shareholder is a family in the case of 
FBs, and e.g. holding companies, banks and so on in the case 
of NFBs.  




options on the firm‟s stock), their decisions impact 
their own wealth. Further, the impact of the directors‟ 
decisions on their wealth is compounded when the 
receipt of stock or options is a component of their 
compensation package. Consequently, they are less 
likely to take actions that would reduce shareholder 
wealth. According to this hypothesis, a positive 
relationship between insider ownership and firm value 
exists.  
On the other hand, Demsetz (1983) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in the insiders´ 
ownership stakes may also have adverse effects in 
reconciling agency conflicts  and these can lead to an 
increase in insiders´ opportunism. They contend that 
market discipline will force insiders to adhere to value 
maximisation at very small levels of insider 
ownership, but high levels of insider ownership could 
lead to entrenchment, because passive shareholders 
find it difficult to monitor and control the actions of 
such insiders. In this sense, it is possible that insiders 
have sufficient control to follow their own objectives 
without taking into account the interest of all 
shareholders. According to the entrenchment 
hypothesis, at high levels of insider ownership, firm 
value may be affected adversely. The entrenchment 
effect implies that high levels of insider ownership 
create incentives for the large active shareholder to 
expropriate wealth from minority investors (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997; Stulz, 
1988).  
Given these two opposing forces (convergence 
and entrenchment), as Morck et al. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), among others 
suggest, the relation between director ownership and 
performance depends on which force dominates with 
any particular degree of director‟s equity ownership. 
Insiders are faced with both positive and negative 
incentives to ensure that they follow objectives which 
maximize shareholder wealth. The effectiveness of 
these incentives is potentially a function of the level 
of insider ownership in the firm. Therefore, we expect 
a nonlinear relationship between directors‟ 
shareholdings and firm value to exit. Prior studies 
show that there is great disparity in the functional 
form of such a relation. While some studies found a 
quadratic relationship (e.g. Adams and Santos, 2006; 
Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Faleye, 2007; Mc 
Connell and Servaes, 1990), others evidenced that a 
cubic relationship exists (e.g. Miguel et al., 2004; 
Morck et al., 1988; Holderness et al., 1999). A meta-
analytical study by Sánchez-Ballesta and García-
Meca (2007) on the insider ownership/firm value 
relationship provides both evidence of the 
convergence of interests and support for the 
entrenchment hypothesis. Although they offer 
evidence of the nonlinear relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value, they cannot 
account for the different inflection points found, 
which may also vary according to the system of 
corporate governance. Bearing in mind the above 
arguments, and following Morck et al. (1988) and 
Miguel et al. (2004), we propose that there is a cubic 
relationship between firm value and insider 
ownership. More specifically, we expect that firm 
value increases with insider ownership at low and 
high levels (as a result of the convergence of interest 
effect) and decreases with insider ownership at 
intermediate levels (as a consequence of the insiders‟ 
entrenchment effect). 
 
2.1. Family and non-family large 
shareholders  
 
Previous empirical research ignore the diverse 
identities of various types of investors, such as large 
family shareholders, who may have different interests, 
time horizons, and strategies from typical public 
investors (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In this paper, 
we adopt a contextual approach and propose the 
propensity of insiders to maximise/expropriate 
shareholder wealth to be a function not only of the 
level of insider ownership in the firm but also of the 
identity of the large shareholder. The effect of insider 
ownership on firm value depends on the agency 
problem it is supposed to solve and agency problems 
in FBs are different from those in NFBs. Agency 
theorists acknowledge that directors and boards vary 
in their incentives to monitor in order to protect 
shareholder interests; as a result, incentives are an 
important precursor to effective monitoring (Fama, 
1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For family owners 
it is natural to have a board presence and they are 
usually managers as well (Lane et al., 2006). 
Therefore, directors´ ownership is greater when the 
controlling shareholder is a family, as there is a high 
degree of convergence between insider and family 
ownership (Block et al., 2011; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001). In publicly traded FBs, family 
controlling shareholders have strong incentives to 
monitor management, in order to protect family 
wealth (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Barontini and 
Caprio, 2006; McVey and Draho, 2005), thereby 
mitigating the classical agency problem between 
owners and managers (Agency Problem I, Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). FBs are characterized by 
involvement-oriented management philosophies, 
strong firm identification, low reliance on institutional 
powers, and personal and social fulfilment (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Corbetta and Salvato 2004; Miller 
and Le Breton-Miller, 2006). The purpose of 
investment of large family shareholders is not to 
produce short-term gains, as with others shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); rather, particularly for 
FBs, the shareholders tend to maintain a long term 
perspective on their investment that benefits current, 
as well as future, generations. FBs are institutions in 
which family owners, freed from short-term financial 
market demands, are emotionally committed to the 
long-run survival and reputation of their firms as their 
fortunes, careers, and their personal honour, as well as 




that of their children and ancestors, are at stake 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). 
Another type of agency cost, however, can be 
higher within publicly trade FBs with respect to their 
nonfamily counterparts. Concentrated family 
ownership brings about the risk of power abuse and 
extraction of private benefits at the expense of non-
family minority shareholders (Agency Problem II, 
Villalonga and Amit 2006). If the large shareholder is 
not a family (e.g. holding companies, banks), the 
private benefits of control are diluted among several 
independent owners. As a result, the large 
shareholder‟s incentives for expropriating minority 
shareholders are small, but so are its incentives for 
monitoring the manager, and thus we revert to 
Agency Problem I. By contrast, if the large 
shareholder is an individual or a family, it has greater 
incentives for both expropriation and monitoring, 
which are thereby likely to lead Agency Problem II to 
overshadow Agency Problem I. Therefore, family 
influence needs to be balanced with corporate 
structures which limit the family‟s discretion over 
firm resources and the danger of expropriation of firm 
wealth (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Furthermore, 
within the setting of FBs, three another sources of 
moral hazard can be identified, which set them apart 
from their non-family counterparts (Bammens et al., 
2010; Mazzi, 2011): (1) the owning-family‟s pursuit 
of its own non-economic interests, which refers to the 
threat of owning-families pursuing non-economic 
family objectives (keeping the control of the 
company, firm survival, financial independence 
and/or family harmony)  to the detriment of non-
family stakeholders‟ interests (Block et al., 
2011;McVey et al., 2005); (2) the parental tendency 
to act upon altruistic motives, which concerns the risk 
of self-control problems exacerbated by parental 
altruism (Schulze et al., 2001); and (3) the different 
nuclear family units‟ pursuit of their own interests, 
which refers to moral hazard problems that may arise 
from intrafamily divergence of interests. When family 
control is very high, unorthodox methods, such as 
favoritism of family members, for determining board 
composition can emerge, which can be detrimental to 
minority shareholders.Thus, the coincidence between 
owners and managers/directors in FBs can lead to 
family entrenchment and delays in the succession to 
lead the company (Lane et al., 2006).This often 
results in family shareholders having control rights 
significantly in excess of their cash-flow rights.   
Summing up, family ties can also explain non-
linearities in the relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value in terms of potential 
benefits and costs of family ownership. Both effects 
of insider ownership on firm value, positive and 
negative, are expected to be more pronounced in 
family organizations. The positive relationship will be 
enhanced by altruistic effects generated as result of 
their longer investment horizons (Schulze et al., 
2001), while the negative relationship will do so for 
the greater likelihood of expropriation of minority 
shareholders (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001). The 
disadvantages of having a family member as the 
principal shareholder of the company are more likely 
to arise when his stake in the company is too high. It 
will contribute to improved firm value as family 
ownership increases up to a certain level, beyond 
which it will have the opposite effect. Therefore, we 
expect lower free-rider agency costs and superior 
convergence of interest in FBs as compared with 
NFBs for low levels of director ownership, whereas at 
higher levels we expect the entrenchment effect to 
prevail over the convergence one. Consistently, we 
postulate that the point at which the likelihood of 
minority shareholder expropriation will begin to 
dominate the convergence of interest will be higher in 
FBs than in NFBs. 
 
3. Methodological Issues: Sample, 




The sample used in our analysis comprises a panel of 
non-financial, publicly traded firms from Spain, 
Portugal and Italy during the 2001-2007 period. We 
chose these countries because of the origin of their 
legal systems. The latter were developed within the 
tradition of French Civil Law, and thus, both the 
ownership concentration and the proportion of family 
controlling shareholders tend to be higher than in 
countries whose legal systems originated from 
Common Law due to the lower level of protection of 
shareholder interests in the former (La Porta et al., 
1999).  
Our starting point was the construction of a 
database of FBs and NFBs operating in the three 
selected European countries. This database was drawn 
up manually based on information provided by the 
supplier Bureau Van Dyjk on ownership structures 
and public information on significant shareholders 
available from stock market regulators and/or on 
company websites. Information on management and 
boards was collected from firms‟ financial and 
corporate reports. For financial and market data, we 
used the Amadeus Database, the financial reports 
released by firms and the data from the stock 
exchanges of the three countries. 
Following La Porta et al. (1999), we used 
control chain methodology to identify firms´ owners. 
Because our aim was to obtain a sample that was as 
homogeneous as possible and would thus allow us to 
link the differences found to the identity of the 
controlling shareholder and not to the level of 
concentration of property rights, we only included 
firms with an ultimate owner. We considered a 
company to have an ultimate owner if the main 
shareholder directly or indirectly held a percentage of 
the company greater than or equal to 25% (García-




Ramos and Olalla, 2011)
11
. On the basis of these 
criteria, all of the firms in our sample have a 
concentrated ownership structure. For a business to 
qualify as a FB, we required family members not only 
to control at least 25% of property rights together but 
also to be actively involved in the control and/or 
management of the firm. Correspondingly, we divided 
the sample into two groups, FBs and NFBs. 
Moreover, we only included those firms for which 
information was available on all of the variables 
considered for a sufficient number of years according 
to the econometric technique used
12
. After we had 
applied these filters, the number of companies 
included in the sample was 215, 34.42 % were 
classified as FBs. 
 
3.2. Variables  
 
Variables may be classified into three groups: a 
dependent variable measuring firm value, explicative 
variables measuring insider ownership and control 
variables.  
We used Tobin´s q as measure of firm value. We 
approximated this variable using each firm's ratio of 
market to book value ratio (Q), which we calculated 
as the book value of total assets minus the book value 
of common equity plus the market value of common 
equity divided by the book value of total assets. Many 
other studies use either this measure or a similar one 
as the dependent variable in research on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms for 
both financial and non-financial firms (e.g., Alonso-
Bonis and Andrés-Alonso, 2007; Andrés et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2008; Miguel et al., 2004).  
With regard to the explicative variables 
representing insider ownership we used directors´ 
ownership, which we calculated as the proportion of 
shares owned by directors of the board of each 
company. We also included directors´ownership
2
, 




is the cube of the variable directors´ ownership. 
Finally, control variables that influence firm 
value were included to avoid any bias in the results, 
consistent with prior studies of corporate governance 
                                                          
11 We chose this threshold for two reasons. First, whereas 
the existing literature on the USA used levels of 10% and 
20%, we tried to adjust to the more concentrated 
ownership structures of most European countries. Second, 
we sought to maintain consistency with the official 
definition of a family business in Europe as approved in 
2008 by two international institutions representing FBs, the 
European Group of Owner Managed and Family Enterprises 
(GEEF) and the Board of the Family Business Network. 
12 We needed available data for at least five consecutive 
years within the 2001-2007 period to test the second-order 
serial correlation (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which is 
fundamental to guaranteeing the robustness of the 
estimations made via the GMM System methodology. 
and firm value (e.g., Alonso-Bonis and Andrés-
Alonso, 2007; Andrés et al., 2005;Chen et al., 2008; 
Miguel et al., 2004). First we included the lag value of 
Tobin´s q (lag firm value) to control for dynamic 
endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2011). Although most 
studies of the relation between governance and 
performance ignore dynamic endogeneity (the idea 
that a firm‟s current performance affects both future 
governance and future performance), theory suggests 
that a firm‟s characteristics and its contracting 
environment affect both performance and governance, 
and, therefore, ignoring dynamic endogeneity may 
introduce bias into estimates of the relation between 
governance and performance. The size of the 
company was approached by the natural logarithm of 
book value of total assets (firm size), because the 
inclusion of the variable in absolute terms might lead 
to heteroskedasticity and spurious correlation 
problems. Previous studies have found that 
organisation size is related to organisation 
performance for various reasons, including 
diversification, economies of scale, access to less 
expensive sources of funds, and so forth, suggesting 
that size should be included as a control variable. 
Degree of financial leverage was calculated as the 
ratio of total firm debt to total assets (firm debt). This 
figure was included because firm debt provides a 
mechanism for curbing agency costs. The age of the 
firm, which was proxied by the natural logarithm of 
the number of years since the firm was founded (firm 
age), was included to control for the company‟s life 
cycle and its growth options. 
Industrial allocation of companies
13
was 
performed through a set of 7 dummies (sectorz: with z 
ranging from 1 to 7, which takes a value of 1 when 
the firm belongs to sector z and a value of 0 
otherwise). These variables were included to monitor 
industry-level factors such as economies of scale and 
competitive intensity, which may account for 
variation in firm value across industries. Year 
allocation of observations was performed through a 
set of 6dummies (yearx: with x ranging from 1 to 6, 
which takes a value of 1 when the sample observation 
corresponds to year x and a value of 0 otherwise). 
These variables were included to take into account 
macroeconomics effects. Country allocation of 
companies was performed through a set of 2 dummies 
(countryy: with y ranging from 1 to 2, which takes a 
value of 1 when the firm belongs to country y and 0 
otherwise). They were included to take into account 
differences among countries because there is evidence 
to suggest that there are country-specific factors that 
may affect corporate governance relationships. 
                                                          
13We adopted the SIC classification (2003) (Standard 
Industrial Classification of Economic Activities). We 
excluded the financial sector because its corporate 
governance is highly specific and because it has its own 
regulations. 




Table 1sums up the descriptive statistics for our two subsamples. 
 
Table1.  Descriptive statistics NFBs and FBs 
 
Variable Mean Median 
 NFBs FBs NFBs FBs 
Firm value 1.48 1.41 1.13 1.20 
Directors´ ownership 0.19 0.40 0.04 0.53 
Firm size 13.50 12.91 13.19 12.58 
Firm debt 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.63 
Firm age 3.20 3.30 3.18 3.31 
 
As shown in Table 2, the correlation coefficients 
are weak and do not violate the assumption of 
independence between the variables. To test for 
multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
was calculated for each independent variable. The 
results indicate that all of the independent variables 
had VIF values of less than 10 and that there are 
therefore not problems of multicollinearity (Myers, 
1990). 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
Correlation 1 2 3 4 FIV 
1Firm value 1.00         
2Directors´ ownership 0.03  1.00      1.08 
3 Firm size -0.15 *** -0.29 *** 1.00    1.28 
4Firm debt -0.03  -0.13 *** 0.33 *** 1.00  1.17 
5 Firm age -0.13 *** -0.00  0.16 *** 0.01  1.03 
*** denotes signification at the 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10% level 
 
3.3. Econometric methodology  
 
The methodology employedis closely linked to having 
observations of the same firm at different points in 
time. Thus, the econometric approach used to test our 
hypotheses is panel data, which allows us to account 
for individual unobservable heterogeneities between 
different companies and to eliminate the risk of 
obtaining biased resultsthrough the breakdown of the 
error term into several components
14
.This issue is 
particularly important when comparing FBs to NFBs 
and when analysing corporate governance structures. 
It should be taken into account that all firms and, 
more specifically, those owned and controlled by 
families, have their own particularities (McVey et al., 
2005) giving rise to specific behaviours closely linked 
to firm culture, which in FBs is instilled by the 
controlling family and manifests itself in the decision-
making process and consequently in firm value. 
The potential endogeneity of ownership structure 
may seriously affect the ownership-value relation 
(Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Demsetz, 1983; 
                                                          
14uit = YEARxCOUNTRYy + SECTORz+ vit  where i is the 
specific error of individual i (unobserved heterogeneity) and 
which lists the unobservable effects that only affect the 
company i; vit is the random disturbance; YEARt represents 
those shocks that occur at time t and affect all individuals 
equally; COUNTRYyand SECTORz represent country and sector 
specific effects respectively. 
Himmelberget al., 1999; Palia, 2001)
15
. Thus, to 
address the endogeneity problem that arises in our 
analysis, we used the generalised method of moments 
system estimator
16
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
Using the above methodology, we proposed a 
model that explained firm valuein accordance with the 
explicative variables related to insider ownership and 
the control variables considered. To test whether there 
were any significant differences between the sub-
samples of FBs and NFBs, separate models were 
estimated for each of them, where subscripts i and t 
referred to the firm and time period, respectively. The 
steps undertaken in running the regressions are as 
follows. First, we entered the explicative variable 
insider ownership. In step two, we entered also the 
quadratic term insider ownership
2
. In the third step, 
we included the cubic term insider ownership
3
. 
Finally, we showed the model with all explicative 
variables and the control variables: 
                                                          
15 See Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
for the endogeneity of ownership concentration, and 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Palia (2001) for the 
endogeneity of insider ownership. 
16 The parameters were calculated in two steps, as this 
method is robust to heteroskedasticity.Using the Wald test 
of heteroskedasticity, we found that our sample suffered 
from this problem. 





FIRM VALUEit = 0+1DIRECTORS´ OWNERSHIPit +2 DIRECTORS´ OWNERSHIPit
2
 +3 DIRECTORS´ 
OWNERSHIPit
3
+4FIRM SIZEit + 5FIRM DEBTit +6 FIRM AGEit + (YEARxCOUNTRYy 
+ SECTORz + vit) 
 
 
Additionally, and in order to identify the optimal 
level of insider ownership for each subsample, we 
derive the optimal levels of insider ownership at 
which the firm values are maximized. To that end and 
according to Miguel et al. (2004), we solve for the 
first derivative of firm value with respect to insider 
ownership. Note that these cut-off points are the 
inflection points at which the relation between insider 
ownership and firm value turns from positive to 
negative or from negative to positive.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
The results of the models´ estimations are reported in 
Tables 3 and 4 for NFBs and FBs respectively. For 
each model, we have presented estimated coefficients 
and indicated whether they are statistically different 
from zero (p-value). The joint F tests of the overall 
statistical significance confirm the validity of our two 
final models IV and VIII for NFBs and FBs 
respectively (57.76 for NFBs and 9.42 for FBs,with p-
values < 0.001). The AR2 tests confirm the absence of 
second-order serial correlation
17
 (-1.03for NFBs and 
0.05 for FBs,with p-values> 0.1). Finally, the Hansen 
tests confirm the validity of the instruments we used 
to avoid the endogeneity problem (22.80for NFBs and 
7.38 for FBs, with p-values> 0.1). 
 
4.1. Results for NFBs 
 
According to Table 3, the contribution of insider 
ownership to firm value in NFBs is non-linear. More 
specifically, our empirical results show a significant 
cubic relationship between insider ownership and firm 
value. In particular, the relationship is negative for 
low levels of insider ownership, as the coefficient of 
directors´ ownership shows (-1.647 and p-value < 
0.05), positive for intermediate levels of insider 
ownership, as the coefficient of directors´ ownership
2
 
shows (4.226 and p-value < 0.05), and negative for 
high levels of insider ownership, as the coefficient of 
directors´ ownership
3
 shows (-2.654 and p-value < 
0.1).  
With the estimated coefficients we optimally 
derive the inflection points at which the relationship 
between insider ownership and firm value in NFBs 
turns firstly from negative to positive and lastly from 
                                                          
17 Given the use of first-difference transformations, we 
expected some degree of first-order serial correlation (test 
AR1), and this correlation does not invalidate our results. 
However, the presence of second-order serial correlation 
does signal omitted variables. 
positive to negative
18
 (see Figure 1). Results show 
that if directors´ ownership is between 0 and 25.72%, 
increases in directors´ ownership will result in lower 
firm value. If directors´ ownership ranges from 25.72 
to 77.59%, increases in directors´ ownership will 
result in higher firm value. Finally, when directors´ 
ownership is above 77.59%, increases in directors´ 
ownership will result in lower firm value.  We 
interpret this evidence as consistent with both the 
convergence of interest and the entrenchment 
hypotheses.  
These results point out that, in NFBs, for high 
levels of insider ownership the entrenchment 
hypothesis prevails. In these contexts, insiders are 
looking out for their own welfare rather than that of 
all firm‟s shareholders (Stulz, 1988). The finding that 
firm value decreases for the very highest insider 
ownership levels-above 77.59%-compared to previous 
studies is consistent with the argument that the 
entrenchment effect for firms with a large nonfamily 
shareholder in Southern Europe requires higher 
ownership than for firms in USA
19
 (e.g., Holderness 
et al. (1999) or Morck et al. (1988) show that insiders 
get entrenched when ownership ranges from 5 to 
25%; Adams and Santos (2006), Barnhart and 
Rosenstein (1998), Faleye (2007) or McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) show that insiders get entrenched 
when ownership is above 10, 34, 5 and 40% 
respectively).This may be due to greater institutional 
ownership in these firms, reducing the ability of 
insiders to entrench themselves. 
However, for intermediate levels of insider 
ownership-ranging from 25.72 to 77.59%-the 
convergence of interest hypothesis dominates. In this 
situation, insiders have greater incentives to maximize 
firm value as their equity holding grows. Consistent 
with Morck et al. (1988), Short and Keasey (1999) at 
above a certain level of ownership, corporate directors 
are faced with such severe financial penalties for 
failing to maximise the value of their companies that 
they are forced to make decisions which will 
maximise firm value, regardless of how this affects 
their private benefits of control. 
 
                                                          












19Miguel et al. (2004) show that in Spain insiders get 
entrenched when ownership ranges from 35 to 70%, 
although their sample includes all quoted companies' for the 
period ranging from 1990 to 1999 and therefore they are 
considering both firms with and without a large 
shareholder. 




Table 3.  GMM Estimations for NFBs 
 
Coefficients from the System GMM regression are reported. Yes: inclusion of dummy variables. Wald-test year dums: Wald 
test of the joint significance of the year's dummy variables; Wald–test country dums: Wald test of the joint significance of the 
countries‟ dummy variables; Wald–test sector dums: Wald test of the joint significance of the sector's dummy variables. 
JOINT F-test: F test of the joint significance of the variables in the model, under the null hypothesis of lack of relationship. 
Hansen: over-identifying restriction test, distributed as a chi-square under the null hypothesis of no relation between the 
instruments and the error term. AR(1) is the first order serial correlation statistic using residuals in first differences, under the 
null hypothesis of non-serial correlation.AR(2) is the second order serial correlation statistic using residuals in first 
differences, under the null hypothesis of non-serial correlation. 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 





















































Firm size       -0.004 
(0.046) 
** 
Firm debt       0.125 
(0.301) 
 
Firm age       -0.017 
(0.459) 
 
year        YES  
country        YES  
sector       YES  
Inflection points   
 
   25.72% 
77.59% 
 
Tests of significance:         
Wald-test year dums   
 
   7.22 
(0.000) 
*** 
Wald-test country dums   
 
   3.35 
(0.038) 
** 
Wald-test sector dums   
 
   0.74 
(0.641) 
 









Instruments validity test:         









Autocorrelation test:         
















*** denotes signification at the 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10% level 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between firm value and directors´ ownership in NFBs 
 
 




The finding that firm value increases at an 
intermediate level of insider ownership range of 
25.72–77.59% compared to previous studies is 
consistent with the argument that interest alignment 
for firms with a large nonfamily shareholder requires 
higher ownership than for firms in USA (e.g. 
Holderness et al. (1999) or Morck et al. (1988) show 
that the convergence of interests prevails when 
ownership ranges from 0 to 5%; Adams and Santos 
(2006), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), Faleye 
(2007) or McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that 
the convergence of interests prevails when ownership 
ranges from 0 to 10, 34, 5 and 40% respectively). The 
initial decline in Q as ownership increases from 0% to 
25.72% is puzzling as directors´ entrenchment is 
unlikely to occur at such a low level of ownership 
except for very large firms with very highly 
diversified ownership (Cui and Mark, 2002). It is 
possibly that in these firms low insider ownership 
(below25.72%) is insufficient to align managers and 
shareholders interests to overcome the control of the 
board by insiders. In fact, increases in ownership at 
low levels would merely serve to provide more 
control by insiders. Another reason may be that these 
increases of ownership at low levels result from 
generous awards of stock and stock options by 
insider-dominated boards that are viewed negatively 
by the market. 
As for the remainder of the variables included in 
the model, our results are robust to the inclusion of 
control variables. We have found that lag firm value 
has a positive and significant effect on firm value, 
confirming the dynamic endogeneity. The effect of 
firm size on firm value is negative, while the 
contribution of firm debt is not significant. Finally, 
year and country effects are significant, while sector 
effects are not. 
 
4.2. Results for FBs 
 
According to Table 4, the contribution of insider 
ownership to firm value in FBs is non-linear. More 
specifically, our empirical results show a significant 
U-shaped
20
 relationship between insider ownership 
and firm value, as the positive coefficient of 
directors´ ownership (1.292 and p-value < 0.01) and 
the negative coefficient of directors´ ownership
2
 (-
0.790 and p-value < 0.01) indicate.  
With the estimated coefficients we optimally 
derive the inflection point at which the relationship 
                                                          
20As it is shown in Table 4, the coefficient of directors´ 
ownership3 is positive but non-significant. Therefore, we 
have not included the cubic form of insider ownership in the 
final model VIII, but we have model it as a quadratic 
relationship. Moreover, when modelling the relationship 
between firm value and insider ownership in FBs as a cubic 
relationship, one of the inflection points indicate an insider 
ownership above 100% of property rights and total control 
rights are, reasonably, required to sum to 100%. 
between insider ownership and firm value in FBs 
turns from positive to negative
21
 (see Figure 2). 
Results show that if directors´ ownership is between 0 
and 81.74%, increases in directors´ ownership will 
result in higher firm value. If directors´ ownership is 
above 81.74% increases in directors´ ownership will 
result in lower firm value. These results point out that, 
in FBs, for directors´ ownership up to 81.74% insiders 
have greater incentives to maximize firm value as 
their equity holding grows and, thus, the convergence 
of interest hypothesis prevails. However, for very 
high levels of directors´ ownership the entrenchment 
hypothesis dominates, because benefits deriving from 
the alignment of interests will be offset by drawbacks 
resulting from family entrenchment and then by the 
expropriation of non-family minority shareholders´ 
value. 
This result is consistent with Miguel et al. 
(2004), who found that the value of Spanish firms 
rises as ownership concentration increases from 0 to 
87%. Although we are considering not the level of 
ownership concentration, but the insider ownership, 
as we have stated in the theoretical section of the 
paper there is a high convergence between ownership 
concentration and insider ownership in FBs (Block et 
al., 2011).  
As for the remainder of the variables included in 
the model, our results are robust to the inclusion of 
control variables. We found that lag firm value has a 
positive and significant effect on firm value, 
confirming the dynamic endogeneity. Firm size had 
not a significant effect on firm value, while the effect 
of firm debt is negative. Finally, year, country and 
sector effects are significant.  
 
                                                          











Table 4.  GMM Estimations for FBs 
 
Coefficients from the System GMM regression are reported. Yes: inclusion of dummy variables. Wald-test year dums: Wald test of the joint 
significance of the year's dummy variables; Wald–test country dums: Wald test of the joint significance of the countries‟ dummy variables; 
Wald–test sector dums: Wald test of the joint significance of the sector's dummy variables. JOINT F-test: F test of the joint significance of 
the variables in the model, under the null hypothesis of lack of relationship. Hansen: over-identifying restriction test, distributed as a chi-
square under the null hypothesis of no relation between the instruments and the error term. AR(1) is the first order serial correlation statistic 
using residuals in first differences, under the null hypothesis of non-serial correlation.AR(2) is the second order serial correlation statistic 
using residuals in first differences, under the null hypothesis of non-serial correlation. 
 
 Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII 
















































Directors´ ownership3     1.241 
(0.140) 
   
Firm size       0.016 
(0.784) 
 
Firm debt       -0.308 
(0.040) 
** 
Firm age       0.078 
(0.139) 
 
year        YES  
country        YES  
sector       YES  
Inflection points       81.74%  
Tests of significance:         
Wald-test year dums   
 
   12.89 
(0.000) 
*** 
Wald-test country dums   
 
   3.17 
(0.048) 
** 
Wald-test sector dums   
 
   1.95 
(0.100) 
* 









Instruments validity test:         




























*** denotes signification at the 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10% level 
 




Figure 2. Relationship between firm value and directors´ ownership in FBs 
 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that the effect of 
directors´ ownership on firm value changes depending 
on the identity of the large shareholder. Contrasting 
findings for FBs and NFBs may suggest that the 
qualitative dimension of the ownership structure 
(whether the company is family or not family 
controlled) is of importance. The positive effect of 
directors‟ ownership on firm value (as a result of the 
convergence of interests) is more prevalent in FBs 
than in NFBs, due to altruistic effects generated by 
family ties and the longer time horizons of family 
shareholders (Block et al., 2011; Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2006; Schulze et al., 2001). The finding that 
firm value increases at a higher level of directors´ 
ownership range of 25.72–77.59% in NFBs as 
compared with rises from 0% up81.74% of directors´ 
ownership in FBs is consistent with the argument that 
interest alignment for NFBs requires higher 
ownership than for FBs. Whereas the market is 
penalizing NFBs for low levels of directors´ 
ownership, because investors are interpreting 
increases in ownership at low levels would merely 
serve to provide more control by insiders, FB 
investors believe in the business‟s long-term 
investment philosophy of FBs that creates one of their 
greatest competitive advantages (Habbershon and 
Williams, 1999). Family shareholders with controlling 
power and many shares are more likely to supervise 
the company to protect their own interests due to the 
greater linkage between their own wealth and 
company performance. In a study of continental 
Europe, Barontini and Caprio (2006) found that only 
when the family is not represented in the board do 
FBs seem to perform worse than NFBs. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) have suggested that family ownership 
and management can add value when a country‟s 
political and legal systems do not provide sufficient 
protection against the expropriation of minority 
shareholders‟ value by the majority shareholder. This 
suggestion has been formalised by Burkart et al. 
(2003). Their results show that in economies with a 
strong legal system that prevents expropriation by 
majority shareholders, a professionally managed firm 
with widely held stock is optimal. However, where 
the legal system cannot protect minority shareholders, 
as in most countries in the European context (La Porta 
et al., 1999), it is optimal to keep both control and 
management within the family. Empirical evidence 
for Western Europe (Maury, 2006) shows that there 
are benefits to family control with respect to control 
by other non-family blockholders in non-majority-
held firms. 
However, although it is possible that FBs may be 
influenced by family shareholders´ interest other than 
profit maximization, including family harmony, firm 
survival or the continuation of family ownership, 
management and control, the likelihood of 
expropriation minority shareholders´ wealth does not 
seem to be more prevalent in FBs than in NFBs in our 
sample. As it is shown in table 5, the entrenchment 
effect occurs at a similar level of directors‟ ownership 
in both FBs and NFBs. At levels around80% of 
directors‟ ownership, insiders become sole owners 
and have complete control of the company. The 
Southern European capital markets are relatively 
illiquid, as compared to those of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. The 
expropriation of minority shareholders may be more 
likely when stockmarkets are illiquid, since the 
relative low liquidity of capital market would 
impedeminority shareholders to sell out when they 
perceive abuses by controlling owners (Maug, 1998; 




This paper investigates the relationship between 
directors´ shareholdings as an internal governance 
structure and firm value in the Southern European 
context. We adopt a contingency approach wherein 
the impact of directors´ shareholding on firm value is 
seen as a relationship that varies depending on 
circumstances. By using a panel data sample and 
taking into account the endogenous nature of 




ownership structure, we found evidence consistent 
with both the convergence of interest and the 
entrenchment hypotheses.  
Moreover, our research highlights the 
importance of suitably contextualising any assessment 
of insider ownership as a business governance 
mechanism. In this sense, the analysis showed that 
within a context of high ownership concentration, the 
identity of the large shareholder influences the 
relationship between directors´ ownership and firm 
value.  
Overall, the results obtained confirm that insider 
ownership matters and that the convergence of 
interests and the entrenchment effects are different for 
FBs and NFBs. Differences in corporate governance 
systems could explain different value-ownership 
relations across different institutional contexts. 
We feel that the study findings may be 
particularly pertinent for FB owners and board 
members, their advisors, other stakeholders, 
practitioners, regulatory bodies overseeing corporate 
governance, and the scientific community in general. 
Our research has several limitations that suggest 
opportunities for future research. First, it must be 
acknowledged that the analysis is limited to publicly 
traded FBs and NFBs that also have large 
shareholders and that we only considered forms 
operating within the tradition of French Civil Law. 
Further research is needed to test whether the same 
conclusions can be applied to both different countries 
and different legal systems. In addition, FBs may 
have other nonfamily shareholders with controlling 
shares that can influence the behaviour of 
shareholders and family directors and the creation of 
firm value. Future research should analyse the impact 
of the presence of institutional investors on the 
relationship between insider ownership and the value 
of FBs. The analysis carried out here points to the 
need for researchers to further probe the differences 
between FBs and NFBs with regard to their practices 




1. Adams, R. B. and Santos, J. A. C. (2006): “Identifying 
the effect of managerial control on firm performance”. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 41, nº 1–
2, pp. 55–85.  
2. Aguilera RV and Jackson G (2003): “The cross-
national diversity of corporate governance: 
Dimensions and determinants”. Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 28, nº 3, pp. 447–465. 
3. Alonso-Bonis, S. and Andrés-Alonso De, P. (2007): 
“Ownership structure and performance in large 
Spanish companies: Empirical evidence in the context 
of an endogenous relation”. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, vol. 4, nº 4, pp. 206-216. 
4. Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2003): “Founding-
family ownership and firm performance: Evidence 
from the S&P500”. The Journal of Finance, vol. 58, 
nº 3, pp. 1301-1328. 
5. Andrés, P., Azofra, V. and López, F. (2005): 
“Corporate boards in OECD countries: Size, 
composition, functioning and effectiveness”. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 
13, nº 2, pp. 197-210. 
6. Bammens, Y., Voordeckers, W. and Van Gils, A. 
(2010): “Boards of directors in family businesses: A 
literature review and research agenda”. International 
Journal of Management Reviews, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1468-2370.2010.00289.x. 
7. Barnhart, S.W. and Rosenstein, S. (1998):“Board 
composition, managerial ownership and firm 
performance: An empirical analysis”. Financial 
Review,vol. 33, pp. 1-16. 
8. Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006):“The effect of 
family control on firm value and performance: 
Evidence from Continental Europe”. European 
Financial Management,vol. 12, pp. 689–723. 
9. Bartholomeusz, S., and Tanewski, G. A. (2006): “The 
relationship between family firms and corporate 
governance”. Journal of Small Business Management, 
vol. 44, nº 2, pp. 245-267.  
10. Baysinger, B.D. and Butler, H.N. (1985):“Corporate 
governance and the board of directors: Performance 
effects of changes in board composition”. Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 1, pp.101-
124. 
11. Berle, A.A. and Means, C.G. (1932), The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property. Macmillan 
Publishing Co, New York.  
12. Block, J.H., Jaskiewicz, P. and Miller, D. (2011): 
“Ownership versus management effects on 
performance in family and founder companies: A 
Bayesian reconciliation”. Journal of Family Business 
Strategy, vol. 2, nº 4, pp. 232-245. 
13. Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998):“Initial conditions 
and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data 
models”. Journal of Econometrics, vol. 87, pp.111-
143.  
14. Brickley, J.A., Lease, R.C. and Smith, C.W. Jr. 
(1988):“Ownership structure and voting on 
antitakeover amendments”.Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 20, pp. 267-291. 
15. Chen, C., Lin, J. B. and Yi, B. (2008):“CEO duality 
and firm performance - An endogenous issue”. 
Corporate Ownership & Control, vol. 6, nº 1, pp. 58-
65. 
16. Cui, H. and Mak, Y.T. (2002):“The relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance 
in high R&D firms”. Journal of Corporate Finance, 
vol. 8, pp. 313–336. 
17. Demsetz, H. (1983): “The structure of ownership and 
the theory of the firm”. Journal of Law and 
Economics,vol. 26, pp.375-390. 
18. Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985): “The structure of 
corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”. The 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 93, nº 6, pp. 1155-
1177.  
19. Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B. (2001): “Ownership 
structure and corporate performance”. Journal of 
Corporate Finance,vol. 7, pp.209-233.  
20. Díaz, B. and García, M. (2004): “Asymmetric 
information and monitoring behaviour in block trades: 
An empirical analysis for Spain”. Corporate 
Ownership & Control, vol. 2, nº 1, pp. 25-37. 
21. Faleye, O. (2007): “Does one hat fit all? The case of 
corporate leadership structure”. Journal of 




Management and Governance, vol. 11, nº 3, pp. 239-
259. 
22. Finegold, D., Hecht, D. and Benson, G. (2007): 
“Corporate boards and company performance: Review 
of research in light of company reforms”. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 15, 
pp.865-878. 
23. García-Ramos, R. and Olalla, M.G. (2011):“The 
structure of board of directors in family versus non-
family firms: Empirical evidence in Spain”. Revista 
Española de Financiación y Contabilidad-Spanish 
Journal of Finance and Accounting, vol. 40, nº 149, 
pp. 609-636. 
24. Gómez-Mejia, L.R., Nuñez-Nickel, M. and Gutierrez, 
I. (2001): “The role of family ties in agency 
contracts”. Academy of Management Journal, vol. 44, 
pp. 81-96. 
25. Habbershon, T.G. y Williams, M.L. (1999): “A 
resource-based framework for assessing the strategic 
advantages of family firms”. Family Business Review, 
vol. 12, pp.1-22. 
26. Hermalin, B.E. andWeisbach, M.S. (1991): “The 
effect of board composition and direct incentives on 
firm performance”. Financial Management, vol. 20, 
pp.101-112.  
27. Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R. and Palia, D. (1999): 
“Understanding the determinants of managerial 
ownership and the link between ownership and 
performance”. Journal of Financial Economics,vol. 
53, pp. 353-384. 
28. Holderness, C., Kroszner, R. and Sheehan, D. (1999): 
“Were the good old days that good? Changes in 
managerial stock ownership since the Great 
Depression”. Journal of Finance,vol. 54, pp. 435-469. 
29. Huse, M., Hoskisson, R., Zattoni, A. and Viganó, R. 
(2011): “New perspectives on board research: 
Changing the research agenda”. Journal of 
Management and Governance, vol. 15, pp. 5–28. 
30. Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983): “Agency 
problems and residual claims”. The Journal of Law 
and Economics, vol. 26, nº 2, pp. 301-325. 
31. Jensen M.C and Meckling, W.H. (1976):“Theory of 
the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and 
ownership structure”. Journal of Financial 
Economics, vol. 3, nº 4, pp. 305-360. 
32. Jensen, M. (1993): “The modern industrial revolution, 
exit and the failure of internal control systems. 
Journal of Finance, vol. 48, nº 3, pp. 481-531. 
33. Lane, S., Astrachan, J., Keyt, A. and McMillan, K. 
(2006): “Guidelines for family business boards of 
directors”. Family Business Review,vol. 19, nº 2, 47-
167. 
34. La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 
(1999): “Corporate ownership around the world”. The 
Journal of Finance,vol. 54, nº 2, pp. 471-517.  
35. Maug, E. (1998): “Large shareholders as monitors: is 
there a trade-off between liquidity and control?” 
Journal of Finance, vol.  53, pp. 65-97. 
36. Maury, B. (2006): “Family ownership and firm 
performance: empirical evidence from Western 
European corporations”. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, vol. 12, pp. 321–341. 
37. Mazzi, C. (2011):“Family business and financial 
performance: Current state of knowledge and future 
research challenges”. Journal of Family Business 
Strategy, vo. 2, nº 3, pp. 166– 181. 
38. McConnell, J. and Servaes, H. (1990): “Additional 
evidence on equity ownership and corporate value”. 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 27, pp. 595-612. 
39. McVey, H., Draho, J. and Stanley, M. (2005): “U.S. 
family-run companies- they may be better than you 
think”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 
17, nº4, pp. 133-144. 
40. Miguel de, A., Pindado, J. and Torre de la, C. (2004): 
“Ownership structure and firm value: New evidence 
from the Spanish Corporate Governance System” 
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 25, pp.1199–
1207. 
41. Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006): “Family 
Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, 
Stewardship and Capabilities”. Family Business 
Review, vol. 19, nº 1, pp. 73-87. 
42. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988): 
“Management ownership and market valuation: An 
empirical analysis”. Journal of Financial 
Economics,vol. 20, pp. 293-315. 
43. Myers, R. H. (1990), Classical and modern regression 
with applications, (2nd ed.). Boston:PWS-Kent. 
44. Palia D. (2001): “The endogeneity of managerial 
compensation in firm valuation: a solution”. Review of 
Financial Studies,vol. 14, pp.735-764. 
45. Sánchez-Ballesta, J.P. and García-Meca, E. (2007): 
“A meta-analytic vision of the effect of ownership 
structure on firm performance”. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, vol. 15, nº 5, 
pp. 879–893. 
46. Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H., Dino, R.N. and 
Bucchold, A.K. (2001): “Agency relationship in 
family firm: Theory and evidence”. Organization 
Science,vol. 12, nº 2, pp. 9-116. 
47. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997): “A survey of 
corporate governance”. Journal of Finance, vol. 52, 
pp. 737-783. 
48. Short, H., Keasey, K. (1999): “Managerial ownership 
and the performance of firms: evidence from the 
U.K.”. Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 5, pp.79-
101. 
49. Stulz, R.M. (1988):“Managerial control of voting 
rights: financing policies and the market for corporate 
control”. Journal of Financial Economics,vol. 20, pp. 
25–54. 
50. Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006): “How do family 
ownership, control and management affect firm 
value?” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 80, nº 2, 
pp. 385-417. 
51. Wintoki, M.B., Linck, J.S. and Netter, J.M. (2011): 
“Endogeneity and the dynamics of Corporate 
Governance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 
Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=970986. 
 
 
